The Modal Argument is Not Circular by Swinburne, Richard
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 15 Issue 3 Article 8 
7-1-1998 
The Modal Argument is Not Circular 
Richard Swinburne 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Swinburne, Richard (1998) "The Modal Argument is Not Circular," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the 
Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 15 : Iss. 3 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol15/iss3/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
THE MODAL ARGUMENT IS NOT CIRCULAR 
Richard Swinburne 
Hasker's claim that my modal argument for substance dualism is epistemically 
circular is implausible. Someone can accept Premise 2 (which, Hasker claims, 
is the premise which generates the circularity) without ever understanding the 
conclusion, or without accepting Premise 3. 
Hasker claims that my argument for substance dualism is epistemically 
circular in the sense that "no reasonably well-informed person would 
accept the premise who does not already accept the conclusion". The 
premise he has in mind is my premise 2 which says, loosely in words, 
that it is logically possible that I who am conscious in 1984 should go on 
existing in 1985, even if my body is destroyed at the end of 1984 - what-
ever else might be the case in 1984 compatible with my conscious exis-
tence (and the subsequent destruction of my body). The conclusion of 
my argument, however concerns an item not mentioned in this premise 
- "a soul". The term by which this item is introduced needs careful defi-
nition (it has after all been used by philosophers and others in many dif-
ferent senses) - I defined it' as the "immaterial stuff which forms part of 
me". The argument was designed to show that there is a part of me sep-
arate from my body, and has the consequence - given the logical possi-
bility of disembodiment (argued for in the text) - that that is the essential 
part of me. So it does not seem very plausible to suppose that the argu-
ment is epistemically circular in the stated sense - since someone might 
accept the premises without ever understanding the conclusion. The 
grounds for accepting the premises are the coherence of various thought 
experiments described in two pages of my texf; including ones easily 
graspable by seven-year old religious believers or readers of fairy sto-
ries. These thought experiments involve my surviving despite various 
things happening to my body. They do not mention things happening 
in the wider world; but the latter is evidently fairly irrelevant. My sur-
vival is not rendered logically impossible by events further away, such 
as explosions on Jupiter. All philosophical arguments depend on the 
coherence or incoherence of various claims, and the justification for 
these claims depends ultimately on the coherence or incoherence of par-
ticular thought experiments. Almost any philosophical principle can be 
challenged by apparent counter-instances (of a paradoxical kind not ini-
tially considered), which can be ruled out by making the principle more 
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precise. Apparent counter-instances to Premise 2 require it to be tough-
ened up by introducing the notion of a "hard fact" defined in my way 
(no more difficult to understand than the normal notion). But (even 
thus tightened up) the premise can be accepted without any understand-
ing of the item mentioned in the conclusion. 
Another reason why Premise 2 may be accepted by someone who 
denies the conclusion is that they may deny Premise 3 - there are lots of 
philosophers in that category Call those who believe in teletransporta-
tion, for example). Separate arguments are required - which I give - in 
favour of that premise. True, if anyone accepts both Premises 2 and 3 
(and Premise 1) and thinks through what that involves, they will accept 
the conclusion. But of course that goes for any valid argument. And 
they'd need to think it through - I've certainly met professional philoso-
phers who have initially granted me all my premises, but withdrawn 
their initial assent as I went through the argument. 
Premise 3 was not, incidentally, meant to be understood in such a 
way that it ruled out re-creation; only re-creation of me without any part 
of me being re-created. That was, I agree, unclear in the original version 
of the argument. In the revised edition of The Evolution of the Soul, I 
defined q more carefully as follows: "To say, as q does, that my body is 
destroyed in the last instant of 1984, is just to say that my body existed 
during a period terminating with the last instant of 1984, but not during 
any period beginning with that instant.'" 
University of Oxford 
NOTES 
1. The Evolution of the Soul, revised edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997), p. 323. My page references are to the revised edition of this book. I 
mention explicitly below the only place where the text differs from that of 
the original edition. 
2. lbid., pp. 151-2. 
3. Ibid., p. 323. 
